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THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: FROM
REVOLUTION TO DEVOLUTION
0. HOOD PHILLIPS*
Although the British Constitution, from a strictly legal viewpoint,
does not appear to have undergone significant change during the past
200 years,' the government now functions in a far more democratic man-
ner. This Article will survey the trend of democratization under the
British Constitution by examining separately each of the elements of the
constitutional system. These elements first will be considered in the
context of the United Kingdom and its trend toward devolution of
power. Finally, the same elements of British constitutional government
will be considered in the context of the British Commonwealth and its
gradual decentralization of power as new political relationships are de-
veloped with the states and territories that formerly constituted the
British Empire.
Ti UNrED KINGDoM
The Monarcby
No clearly defined watershed can be discerned in the distribution of
power between the sovereign and the royal ministers. After the loss of
the American colonies and the fall of Lord North's ministry in 1782, the
personal role of the monarch in British government steadily decreased,
but the process was gradual and the product both of the inadequacies of
reigning monarchs and of the growth of other sectors of the government.
On the one hand were the illness of George III, at first spasmodic and
later more or less continuous,2 the profligate character of George IV,
* D.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; M.A., LLB., Dublin University; L.L.M., Birming-
ham University. Queen's Counsel, 1970. Visiting Professor of English Law, University
College at Birmingham.
1. Notable exceptions are statutes such as Representation of the People Acts and the
Parliament Acts, with regard to the United Kingdom and, with regard to the Com-
monwealth, the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63, and the Statute
of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4. It should be noted that there are no par-
ticular documents embodying British constitutional law, but there are laws and con-
ventions establishing the functions, composition. and interrelations of the elements of
government, as well as the rights and duties of the governed.
2. Medical opinion now is that George III was not insane but suffered from an acute
intermittent form of porphyria, a rare metabolic disorder.
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the irresolute personality of William IV, and the immaturity of Victoria
when she came to the throne; on the other hand were the outstanding
qualities of such Prime Ministers as the younger Pitt, Melbourne, and
Peel, the growing cohesion of the Cabinet, the reform of the central
departments and of the civil list, and the general ethos of the times. By
the middle of the 19th century the power of the monarch was confined,
in Bagehot's well-known words, to "the right to be consulted, the right
to encourage, the right to warn." 1 Yet the influence of a sovereign who
has been on the throne for some years is far from negligible, for his
experience will be wider and more continuous than that of most minis-
ters. Victoria's interventions cannot be taken as a model for the 20th
century, but George V's reign shows a number of examples of the influ-
ence that can be exerted by the throne. For example, the King brought
the parties together in negotiating the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 192 1,4
though he left the conduct of the negotiations entirely to the Prime
Minister, Lloyd George, and refrained from any comment or interven-
tion while the conference lasted.5
The post of Private Secretary to the monarch has become a very im-
portant link with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and also with Gover-
nors-General and Commonwealth Prime Ministers. In theory, the Home
Secretary was the sovereign's personal secretary, but in 1805, when he
was almost blind and could no longer write his letters, George III ap-
pointed Sir Herbert Taylor to be his personal secretary, and since the
death of the Prince Consort in 1861 that office has been institutionalized.
The sovereign's Private Secretary, who now is sworn of the Privy Coun-
cil, informally seeks information and advice from various sources-min-
isters, Opposition leaders, elder statesmen, and senior officials-and then
briefs the sovereign. Occasions such as the abdication of Edward VIII in
1936, and the choice of Baldwin rather than Lord Curzon as Prime
Minister in 1923, demanded from the King's Private Secretary the ut-
most tact and delicacy of judgment.
The Cabinet"
George III, during the earlier part of his reign, still could hold a per-
sonal ascendancy by trading on the lack of political unity among his
3. W. BAGEHor, Tim ENGLISH CoNsn=zuoN 67 (2d ed. 1872).
4. Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6,
1921, CMD. 1560 (1921), 26 L.N.TS. 10.
5. H. NIcoIoN, KING GEORG V, at 360 (1953).
6. For discussions and documents relating to the Cabinet, see R. CossiAN, I smE Vmw
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ministers, by manipulating the two Houses, and by making use of "hon-
orary" members of the Cabinet. During his reign, however, the Cabinet
established the right to consider matters without reference from the
King. The normal course had been for departmental matters to go from
the minister concerned, to the King, and then to the Cabinet only if the
King so willed. It came to be recognized, however, that even if the King
did not have a duty to consult the Cabinet, he nevertheless generally
was expected to do so. The King consulted the ministers individually in
the closet, but they could agree beforehand in the anteroom upon what
they would say. When the members of Cabinet were all of one party,
they sometimes met as party leaders rather than as the King's advisers;
this paved the way for the Cabinet to become the general initiator of
policy. The absence of the King from nieetings of the Cabinet, which
had become usual after the accession of -George I, was a significant
factor in the development of Cabinet government.
Cabinet unity, one aspect of the collective responsibility of ministers,
grew with the development of political parties and party discipline in the
House of Commons. Nonetheless, a Cabinet sometimes has left a ques-
tion undecided, so that ministers were not committed to a particular
policy. This happened, for example, with Catholic emancipation
under Lord Liverpool's ministry, with the introduction of voting by
ballot, with the extension of the franchise in 1873, and with women's
suffrage. The "agreement to differ" in 1932 was remarkable because
four Liberals in a predominantly Conservative coalition government
were left free to disagree publicly on the vital financial policy of the
government, but the experiment was unsuccessful and the four Liberals
resigned after a few months. Remarkable, too, was the arrangement an-
nounced by Mr. Wilson in the House of Commons early in 1975 that,
though the considered policy of the government was that the United
Kingdom should remain in the European Community on the "renegoti-
ated" terms and that this should be supported in the forthcoming refer-
endum, dissenting ministers (including about one-third of the Cabinet)
should be free to speak and vote outside the House against membership
in the European Economic Community.
At the time of American independence, though ministers could not
stay long in office if the Commons disapproved, they were chosen by
(1972); H. HANHAM, Tim NiNmEmr-CENTmuRy CoNsnrroN 24-105 (1969); W. IvoR
JENNINGS, CABIrET GOV.NWMNT (3d ed. 1969); J. MAcKmrrosm, THE BRIsH CABN r
(1968); P. GORDON WALKEr, THE CABr (rev. ed. 1972); E. NEvniL WILumIAs, Tm
EGHTEENm-CENTuRy CONSnTuON 67-135 (1960).
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the King. Not until Victoria's reign did the Commons have the effective
power to veto the appointment of a minister. The last dismissal of a
minister by the sovereign was in 1834 when Melbourne was forced to
resign,7 and the last occasion on which a sovereign successfully opposed
appointment to office was in 1892 when Victoria, on personal grounds,
refused to accept either Sir Charles Dilke or Henry Labouchere.
All ministers are required by convention to sit in one or the other
house so that their activities may be subject to parliamentary supervision.
Because the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 limits the
number of ministers who may sit in the Commons," some must be in the
Lords, and the government in any event will want to be represented in
the upper house. A modem ministry is represented in the upper house
at least by the Lord Chancellor who presides but lacks the power of the
Speaker of the Commons to control debate, by another senior minister
as Leader of the House, and usually by a few junior ministers.
Perhaps the most interesting change in the Cabinet is the development
of the committee system, which has improved the efficiency of the Cabi-
net and thus allowed an increase in its workload. Committees of the
Cabinet were set up ad hoc in the 19th century to expedite government
business, as was done during the Crimean War. The first standing com-
mittee was the Committee of Imperial Defense set up by Balfour in
1903. During World War I, Asquith and Lloyd George established a
large number of committees, and, during World War II, Churchill did
so more systematically. Between the wars, committees came and went,
with an average of 20 ad hoc committees existing at any one time. Attlee
was the first Prime Minister to have a permanent committee structure in
peacetime, and the pattern of ad hoc committees existing alongside
standing committees has continued since. Some committees are chaired
by the Prime Minister, and some by other ministers, but the membership
and terms of reference of all these bodies are at the discretion of the
Prime Minister. To preserve the principle of Cabinet unity and collective
responsibility, details usually are not made public during the lifetime of a
governmentY
7. Melbourne, however, returned to office for 6 years more after a dissolution granted
to Peel.
8. C. 24, replacing House of Commons Disqualification Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 20.
9. Sometimes the term "Inner Cabinet" is applied to meetings of small informal groups
of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet confidants, but such meetings are probably too
amorphous to be regarded as forming a body as definite as an Inner Cabinet.
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The desultory practice, under the Hanoverians, of keeping Cabinet
minutes lapsed until World War I. Throughout the 19th century the
sovereign was kept informed of Cabinet conclusions in a confidential
letter written in the Prime Minister's own hand, while the other minis-
ters were expected to remember what was decided and to carry out those
decisions in their departments. Lloyd George introduced a Cabinet Secre-
tariat in 1916, and since then, minutes of Cabinet meetings have been
sent to the Sovereign and circulated to Cabinet members. The Secretary
to the Cabinet, who is sworn of the Privy Council, acts as Principal
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister'a
The appointment of the younger Pitt as First Lord of the Treasury
in 1783 may be said to mark the emergence of the modem Prime Minis-
ter. Pitt, who held the chief office for the next 17 years and again from
1804 to 1806, expressed the opinion that it was absolutely necessary that
there should be an avowed and real minister having the major influence
in the council and the principal place in the confidence of the King.
That power, he said, must rest in the person generally called the First
Minister, and that minister ought to be the person at the head of the
finances." The position was brought about by a combination of factors:
possession of the King's confidence, preeminent personality, patronage
as First Lord of the Treasury, and above all, control of the Commons,
which, with the development of the party system, usually involved lead-
ership of the largest party. The authority of the Prime Minister was
established firmly by the late 19th century through the outstanding per-
sonalities of Disraeli and Gladstone.
The Prime Minister now invariably takes the office of First Lord of
the Treasury, which places him technically at the head of the most
important department of state, yet he has only nominal departmental
duties because the working head of the Treasury is the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.' 2 In the 18th and early 19th centuries, before the reform of
10. For discussions of the office of Prime Minister, see Tim BarrsH Pamm Mis'ITER
(A. King ed. 1969); B. CARTER, TnE OrmcE oF Pasm MiNmS-R (1956); W. Ivoa JE~Mi-
INGs, supra note 6; J. MAcKiNTosH, supra note 6; P. GoRDoN WALKER, supra note 6.
11. E. NEviLLB WILLmAMS, supra note 6, at 132.
12. The Ministerial and other Salaries Act 1975, c. 27, fixes a salary for the person
who is Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.
1976] 427
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the civil service' and the parliamentary franchise, the First Lord of the
Treasury exercised a very extensive patronage and consequently could
control departmental appointments; this helped him to obtain a majority
in the Commons for his party. The Prime Minister now is head of the
Civil Service Department and must approve the most senior civil service
appointments.
The chief functions of a modern Prime Minister are to form a ministry
and to choose and preside over the Cabinet. He is the main channel of
communication between the Cabinet and the sovereign. He is the leader
of his party and is primarily responsible for the organization of House
of Commons business, even though this work is delegated to another
minister as Leader of the House. Communicating directly with the other
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, he presides over their London meetings.
The Cabinet Secretariat is under his control, and not only is he briefed
by the Secretary to the Cabinet, but he also can require briefings from
the Permanent Secretaries of the various departments.
Although in the present century the sovereign on several occasions has
been faced with a personal, though limited, choice of Prime Minister,14
in each instance the Prime Minister was resigning for reasons of health
rather than for political reasons, and there was no question of a change of
the party in power. 5 With the development of the party system, the
sovereign's choice of Prime Minister has become a mere formality in
the typical case. Thus in 1855 Victoria, who preferred Lord Derby, was
constrained to appoint Lord Palmerston,' 6 and in 1880 she reluctantly
appointed Gladstone, to whom she was antipathetic, when she would
have preferred HartingtonY.1 If the government is defeated at a general
election, the Prime Minister and the other ministers resign immediately,
13. The Civil Service Commission was established in 1855, following the Trevelyan-
Northcote report on conditions in the civil service, which advocated open competition
in place of nepotism and patronage. In 1870 the principle of open competition by written
examination was applied to all entrants to the home civil service. The Commission makes
regulations, subject to ministry approval, concerning the qualifications for appointment
to civil service posts.
14. For example, George V and Baldwin in 1923, and the present Queen and Harold
MacMillan in 1957.
15. Harold Wilson's notice to the Queen in March, 1976, that he intended to
retire on personal grounds, and the public arrangements made for the governing parlia-
mentary Labor party to elect a new leader who would presumably be appointed Prime
Minister, marked an entirely new departure.
16. Palmerston was a nonrepresentative Irish peer who sat in the Commons.
17. Later 8th Duke of Devonshire.
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and the sovereign, on the advice of the outgoing Prime Minister, sends
for the Leader of the Opposition. In the last century, the Prime Minister
sometimes waited until he met Parliament before resigning, and in 1873,
Disraeli, the Opposition leader, declined to accept office when given the
opportunity because he thought Gladstone's position would be further
damaged if he remained in office a little longer.
It has been suggested that since World War II, if not before, Britain
has had a system of "prime ministerial government " rather than of "cabi-
net government," due to the predominance of the Prime Minister over
his Cabinet. The Prime Minister chooses the other ministers, decides
which of them shall be in the Cabinet, and can require their resignations.
Policy is initiated and many decisions are made by the Prime Minister
outside the Cabinet. He is the political master of the most influential
civil servants, personifies the government in the eyes of the public, plays
a special role in foreign and Commonwealth affairs, and above all, has
the power of advising a dissolution of Parliament. On the other hand
his choices of people and measures are limited by the exigencies
of party politics. He is limited also because all important matters, includ-
ing those requiring legislation, must be approved by the Cabinet. Fur-
thermore, much depends on the respective personalities of the Prime
Minister and his colleagues. The correct conclusion is that even if the
Prime Minister is more powerful than most combinations of ministers,
he usually is less powerful than the Cabinet collectively. Mr. Wilson,
for example, saw his role as that of an executive chairman; according to
him, power still lies in the Cabinet in Parliament.
Government and Parliamnentas
Because of the gradual growth of constitutional usages, the trend to-
ward greater democracy has been apparent in the relationship between
the ministers and Parliament. Most important among these conventions
are the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, the individual responsi-
bility of ministers, and the power of the Prime Minister to advise the
sovereign to dissolve Parliament.
The collective responsibility of the government to the House of Com-
mons now means that the whole ministry resigns with the Prime Minister
if the government party loses its majority of seats at a general election.
18. For discussions of government and parliament, see H. HANHAm, supra note 6; W.
IvoR JENNINGS, supra note 6.
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If the government is defeated in the Commons on a major matter of
policy or on any motion that the Prime Minister regards as a question of
confidence, an event that because of party discipline is very rare when
the government has a party majority in the House, it either resigns or,
more likely, asks for a dissolution. Gladstone's government was defeated
on the budget in 1885 and resigned; the following year it was defeated
on an Irish Home Rule bill19 and asked for a dissolution. The last occa-
sion on which a government was constrained to resign after a defeat in
the House of Commons was in 1895, when Lord Rosebery's ministry
was censured for the inadequate supply of cordite to the army. Mr.
Wilson's government was defeated by one vote in 1970 on a clause of a
bill to give power to the Commercial Court to sit in private, but there
was no question of resignation or dissolution; between January and
March, 1976, his government, with a party majority of four, was de-
feated three times in the Commons. ° Two general elections, however,
had been held in 1974, and because party funds were depleted, no one
wanted another general election. A minority government, one whose
party does not have an overall majority in the House of Commons, will
not feel compelled to resign or dissolve unless defeated on a major issue.2
Collective responsibility requires that if a minister disagrees with the
policy of the Cabinet he must either resign,22 or if the matter is not fun-
damental or does not affect his department, make no public disclosure of
his disagreement. The principle is not applied rigorously to ministers not
in the Cabinet, for they often are not consulted on matters extraneous
to their department; their responsibility is passive rather than active.
Individual responsibility means that a minister is accountable to the
House of Commons for the conduct of his department, not only for his
own acts and omissions, but also for his civil servants' misdeeds of which
he knew or should have known. If he is censured by the House he must
19. Bill No. 181, Sess. 1 (1886), 2 BRIT. SEss. PAPERs 461.
20. On March 10, 1976, the government was defeated in the House (owing to Labor
abstentions) on a major matter of financial policy, but Wilson, instead of xesigning,
successfully moved a vote of confidence the next day.
21. For example, in 1924 Ramsay MacDonald's minority Labor government was de-
feated twice in 8 months, and between March and October 1974, Wilson's govern-
ment was defeated on a number of occasions, yet both governments survived for a time.
22. Thus Anthony Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1938 over Neville Chamber-
lain's policy of appeasing the dictators, Aneurin Bevan resigned as Minister of Health in
1951 over the imposition of National Health charges, and Frank Cousins resigned as
Minister of Science and Technology in 1966 on prices and incomes policy.
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resign. How effective resignation is as a sanction in such cases has been
disputed, because the resigning minister may be appointed to another
post or may be saved by a timely reshuffle of ministerial posts.
By the end of the 18th century, the Opposition had become recog-
nized as having the potential to provide alternative ministers upon resig-
nation or dissolution. Charles James Fox is regarded as having become
the first Leader of the Opposition on the appointment of the
younger Pitt as Prime Minister in 1783, though George Tierney
from 1817 to 1821 was the first holder of this position in the modem
sense. House of Commons business is arranged between the Leader of
the House and the Leader of the Opposition. As Tierney said, the Oppo-
sition has the duty to oppose, but its opposition must be responsible,
for not only are national interests paramount, but the Opposition must
be prepared to take over the government. The shadow cabinet of the
Opposition existed in an inchoate form in the 1860's. The idea emerged
that the Opposition should organize itself on parallel lines to the govern-
ment, and it is said to have become a convention that there should be a
shadow cabinet to constitute an alternative team from which the pro-
spective Prime Minister can choose his senior colleagues. This system has
been formalized in this century by making the Opposition leadership of
each House a salaried position.23
The sovereign in the 18th century was identified so closely with gov-
ernment policy that the defeat of a government was a rebuff to him, but
the Reform Act of 183224 had the effect of separating the sovereign
.from party politics, and there has been no pretext since for refusing to
dissolve Parliament on advice. Conversely, there has been no instance
since the 17th century of a sovereign attempting to dissolve Parliament
without the favorable advice of the ministry. The general conventions,
then, are well established: the sovereign should dissolve Parliament when
so advised and should not dissolve Parliament unless so advised. From
1841 to 1910 the timing of a dissolution, within the maximum statutory
term, was a matter for the Cabinet as a whole, even though the advice
23. The Ministers of the Crown Act 1937, 1 Edw. 8 & I Geo. 6, c. 38, § 5, gave a
salary to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons. The Ministerial
Salaries and Members' Pensions Act 1965, c. 11, § 2, provided salaries for the Leader
of the Opposition in the House of Lords and the Chief Opposition Whip in both
Houses. These enactments are consolidated in the Ministerial and other Salaries Act
1975, c. 27.
24. Representation of the People Act 1832, 2 Will. 4; c. 45 (repealed).
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was conveyed to the monarch by the Prime Minister. In 1918, however,
party leaders of a coalition, Lloyd George and Bonar Law, alone, made
the decision to dissolve; the lapse of time since the last general election in
191025 had caused ministers to forget the former practice. Since then,
rather than being treated as a formal Cabinet matter, the decision to dis-
solve has been made by the Prime Minister after consulting such col-
leagues as he chooses; this development probably is undesirable, because
granting the Prime Minister the ability to time a general election gives
him too much power.
The House of Commons
The democratic trend in the House of Commons can be seen in a
number of areas: qualifications for membership, independence of the
Speaker, the evolution of national parties, and the development of the
modem electoral system and House procedure. Disqualifications for
membership gradually have been eroded during the last two centuries.
Since 1774, it has been unnecessary for a candidate for Parliament to have
any residential connection with his cqnstituency, so that, for example, a
domiciled Englishman can be elected for a Scottish constituency. Civil
disabilities against Protestant dissenters were removed in 1828, and
Catholics were admitted to Parliament by the Roman Catholic Relief Act
1829.26 The parliamentary oath was made acceptable to Jews in 185827;
Quakers, atheists28 and others who objected to taking any kind of oath
later were allowed to make an affirmation. Women became eligible for
the House of Commons in 1918.29
The Act of Settlement 170030 was an attempt to solve the problem
of "placemen" in the House of Commons. "Placemen" are holders of
offices or positions of profit from or under the Crown and pensions at
the pleasure of the Crown, and their presence in the House of Commons
continued to pose a problem for 150 years after the Act. At one time
there may have been as many as 200 placemen, consisting of officers
25. Annual acts of Parliament prolonged the life of the Parliament elected in 1910
because it was impracticable to hold elections in war time.
26. 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, § 2.
27. Jews Relief Act 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 49, S 1, as amended, Promissory Oaths Act
1871, 34 & 35 Vict, c. 48.
28. See Bradlaugh v. Gossett, [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 271.
29. Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 47.
30. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, as amended, Succession to the Crown Act 1707, 6 Anne, c. 41
(taking into account the Union with Scotland).
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of the court, civil servants (some of whom changed with the govern-
ment), members sitting for boroughs controlled by the Crown, and
government contractors. During the 19th century there was a reduction
of the government patronage that gave rise to this problem, but the statu-
tory law on this subject was very confusing. The House of Commons
Disqualification Act 1957 at last reformed and consolidated the law. Ex-
haustive schedules of disqualifying offices now are set out; a limit is
fixed to the number of holders of ministerial offices who may sit at any
one time in the Commons, and holders of government contracts no
longer are disqualified."'
Since 1790, the Speaker has been disqualified from holding an office of
profit under the Crown. The impartiality of the Speaker, however, was
not established until after 1835, during the speakership of Shaw-Lefevre.
The election of a new Speaker by the Commons was opposed excep-
tionally, though unsuccessfully, in the case of Mr. Selwyn-Lloyd in
1971, and this incident, really a demonstration by backbenchers who
thought they ought to be consulted, led to a change in the procedure for
election of the Speaker. The reelection of a Speaker by the Com-
mons was not opposed after a change of party in 1841, and since
then the Speaker of the previous Parliament generally has been
elected unanimously if still a member and willing to stand. A
Speaker takes no active part in a parliamentary campaign, and
it was at one time thought to have become a convention that he should
-not be opposed in his constituency at a general election. Sir Harry Hil-
ton-Foster, however, was opposed by both Labor and Liberal candidates
in 1964 but was reelected as an independent. One of the Speaker's most
important modem functions is the certification of "money bills" for the
purpose of the Parliament Act 1911.82
In the 18th century there were no national parties advocating particu-
lar policies and enjoying the adherence of the great majority of members
of Parliament. Names like "Whig" and "Tory" were bandied about,
but the party system in the modern sense was not yet known. Political
leaders "managed" fewer than half the members of Parliament, for inde-
31. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 20, replaced by the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975,
c. 24. Members of the House of Commons have been paid a salary since 1911, following
the decision of the House of Lords ' Amalgamated Soc'y of R.R. Servants v. Osborne,
[1910] A.C. 87 (1909), that a "political levy" by trade unions on their members to finance
parliamentary candidates was illegal under the law of that time.
32. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 1.
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pendent candidates could gain election to Parliament by purchasing
borough seats despite having no family connection or local interest.
When the Parliamentary Elections Act 1868 transferred jurisdiction to
determine disputed elections from the Commons to the courts, 3 how-
ever, the function of keeping a government in office was assumed by the
parties rather than by the independent members. The Conservative and
Liberal parties developed during the 19th century under such leaders as
Disraeli and Gladstone; the Liberals were largely displaced by the Labor
party after World War I.
The most striking democratic trend in the House of Commons con-
cerned the electorate. The election of members in the 18th century was
conducted on local and personal, rather than national, lines. Electors did
not vote for governments, because general elections did not at that time
coincide with changes of ministry. The cohesion of the Commons neces-
sary to keep the government in power was brought about partly by gov-
ernment patronage, and partly by powerful landowners influencing
elections. The agitation for parliamentary reform that followed Ameri-
can independence and that was given a new impetus by the French
Revolution was directed against bribery and corruption, especially in
connection with "rotten boroughs," and in favor of fairer representation
of the people by a widening of the franchise. The modern history of the
parliamentary franchise begins with the Reform Act of 1832 , 4 event-
ually passed by the Lords rand assented to by William IV on the threat
of the creation of a sufficient number of peers to ensure its passage. This
Act not only abolished the rotten boroughs, but extended the franchise
by means of property qualifications that roughly added the middle
classes to the landed gentry and borough caucuses. Although the propor-
tion of the electorate to the population was raised only from 3 percent to
4 percent, the indirect consequences of the Reform Act were immense.
The Act heralded a succession of Representation of the People Acts that
have continued for more than 100 years, their combined effect making
the Commons the predominant element in the government of the coun-
try, detaching the monarchy from politics and forcing governments to
recognize that they depend upon the suffrage of the electorate. Many ur-
ban workers received the franchise in 1867,3, many agricultural workers
33. 31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, reenacted, Representation of the People Act 1949, 12, 13 &
14 Geo. 6, c. 68, pt. III.
34. Representation of the People Act 1832, 2 Will. 4, c. 45 (repealed).
35. Representation of the People Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 102.
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in 1884,36 all males aged 21 and women aged 30 in 1918,"7 and all women
aged 21 in 1928.8 In 1969, the minimum age for voting, though not for
being elected, was reduced to 18. 39 Meanwhile, property qualifications
for the franchise gradually have been abolished, ordinary residence in
the constituency on the qualifying date being required.
The modem parliamentary electoral system provides for single-mem-
ber constituencies. Independent statutory Boundary Commissions review
the representation in the House of Commons in the four areas of the
United Kingdom and report periodically to the Home Secretary,
who is required to submit the reports to Parliament together
with draft orders in Council giving effect to their recommendations.40
The conduct of elections is controlled in detail by the Representation of
the People Acts of 19494' and 1969,4 which set strict limits on the ex-
penses that may be incurred by or on behalf of a candidate and on the
purposes for which such expenses may be incurred.43 Election to Parlia-
ment in 1970 cost a successful candidate an average of C2,212, two-
thirds of which was for printing and stationery. Legislation against
corrupt and illegal election practices began with Curwen's Act of 1809. 4
The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 188311 strengthened
the law against bribery and corrupt practices, but lavish expenditure by
candidates was a greater problem than actual corruption. The aim of the
Act was to fix maximum expenditures, beyond which the election would
be void.46 Precise accounts were to be rendered to, and published by, the
returning officer,47 and unauthorized expenditure by others was made
an illegal practice.48 Corrupt practices also disqualify one from voting in
any parliamentary election for 5 years, and illegal practices disqualify
36. Representation of the People Act 1884, 43 Vict., c. 3, § 5.
37. Representation of the People Act 1918, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64, § 1, 2, 4 (repealed
in part in 1928).
38. Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 12,§91.
39. Representation of the People Act 1969, c. 15, § 1.
40. House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act 1949, c. 66, § 2(5); see The
Times (London), Oct. 21, 1969, at 13, col. 1.
41. 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 68.
42. C. 15.
43. Id. § 8.
44. Parliamentary Elections Act 1809, 49 Geo. 3, c. 118.
45. 46 & 47 Vict., c. 51.
46. id. H§ 4, 8.
47. Id. § 38.
48. Id. § 13.
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-one for the same period in his constituency.4 9 A vitally important innova-
tion was made by the Ballot Act 1872, which substituted a secret ballot
for the traditional open election at the "hustings." 10 Strict precautions
ensure the continued secrecy of the ballot; disputed elections now are
heard by two high court judges,5 and the sealed ballot boxes may be
opened only on the authority of a high court judge.
The British electoral system admittedly does not produce representa-
tion of the various parties in close proportion to the number of votes
they receive in a general election. Not only does the leading party tend to
get too many seats in proportion to the second party, but in most general
elections since World War II a party returned to power has received
less than half the votes cast. The Liberal party has long been underrepre-
sented in the Commons, and naturally has advocated some system of pro-
portional representation. In this it has been joined by the Scottish and
Welsh Nationalists. Hitherto, both the Conservative and Labor parties
in turn profited sufficiently from the existing system not to want it
changed, but more recently it has become less advantageous for the Con-
servatives, and they are beginning to consider whether some kind of
proportional representation might not Jelp their party to return to office,
at least at the head of an antisocialist coalition.
Procedure in the House of Commons down to the Reform Act of
183252 depended mainly on ancient usage and later parliamentary
practice, and though present procedure still is based partly on the old
sources, much more use has been made since 1832 of standing orders.
Questions to ministers began in a desulf-ory way in the House of Lords
early in the 18th century, but it was after 1832 that the practice really
developed, especially in the Commons, forming a significant part of
parliamentary government from the 1850's. Speakers' rulings require that
a question addressed to a minister relate either to public affairs with
which he is "officially connected," proceedings pending in Parliament, or
matters of administration that come within the work of his department
49. Representation of the People Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 68, § 140(3)-(4),
151.
50. 35 & 36 Vict., c. 33, § 2, repealed, Representation of the People Act 1949, 12, 13 &
14 Geo. 6, c. 68. Secret ballot provisions are now in Representation of the People Act
1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 68, § 12, 23, sched. 2, Parliamentary Election Rules § 20(2),
Local Election Rules § 16(2).
51. Representation of the People Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 68, § 110, repealing
Parliamentary Elections Act of 1868, 31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, § 11.
52. Representation of the People Act 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 (repealed).
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or his official dudes or powers. A minister may decline to answer a ques-
tion on public policy grounds, especially if it involves matters of diplo-
macy or national security. The Prime Minister, with no separate
department of his own except the civil service, has special responsibility
for general government policy and is the residuary target for questions
that seem to be inappropriate for other ministers. Those members on
either side of the Commons who hold no office have no special access
to government information nor any special facilities for research other
than the library of the Commons and the resources any journalist
may have, so the Opposition is at a disadvantage in criticizing govern-
ment policy or conduct or in proposing alternative policies.
The object of many standing orders is to enable more business to be
done by expediting debate. In accord with this, the Closure, or the
"Gag," was adopted in 1887, prompted by the systematic obstruction of
Parliament in the 1880's by Irish Nationalist members who were reelected
with the express purpose of attempting to wreck the proceedings until
home rule was granted. The Closure is a procedure that enables the
Speaker to accept a motion supported by a sufficient number of mem-
bers "that the question be now put."
Standing committees of the House for the consideration of certain
stages of public bills were regularized in 1907, and now the general rule
is that when a public bill has passed the second reading, the House having
approved its general principles, it goes to a standing committee for the
discussion of details and proposed amendments. Standing committees
consist of no more than 50 members selected in proportion to the strength
-of the parties in the House and with regard to the qualification of mem-
bers. Thus, a government, unless it has an appreciable overall party
majority in the Commons, may be defeated in committee from time to
time on particular amendments, though this may be reversed when the
bill is reported to the House. Financial matters always have required spe-
cial procedures; the importance and complexity of these procedures
have exercised the ingenuity of the Commons. Gladstone, when Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer in 1861, had the House set up a Select Commit-
tee of Public Accounts to examine all appropriation accounts and such
other accounts laid before Parliament-now including the accounts of
certain public corporations and the universities-as it sees fit. The Com-
mittee, usually chaired by a member of the Opposition, cross-examines
the chief accounting officer and other senior officers of the departments
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or corporations. The Committee exercises little practical control over
expenditures, partly because it deals with the accounts of the previous
financial year, and partly because the House of Commons seldom has the
time or the inclination to debate its reports. Nevertheless, its mere ex-
istence tends to prohibit departmental proposals for extravagant expendi-
tures. Emphasis recently has shifted from mere accounting to the elimi-
nation of waste and better estimating and contracting.
The Exchequer and Audits Department Act 186658 created the com-
bined post of Comptroller and Auditor-General as an independent
officer who, like the judges, holds office during good behavior, is re-
movable by the Crown only on an address from both Houses, and
whose salary, like that of the judges, is charged on the consolidated fund
instead of being voted annually. As Comptroller he ensures that no pub-
lic money is withdrawn from the consolidated fund without statutory
authority, and that money so withdrawn is properly applied; as Audi-
tor he audits the accounts of the government departments and makes an
annual report to the Public Accounts Committee. Because the estimates
became too complex for the House anl the Public Accounts Committee,
an Estimates Committee was established in 1912 to examine the depart-
mental estimates presented to the House and to suggest how the policy
implicit in them might be carried out more economically. Although
looking at past estimates, the Committee was concerned with the future,
and after 1945 became more interested in policy. It was replaced in
1970 by the Expenditure Committee, whose functions are more extensive
than those of the former Estimates Committee and are more compatible
with new methods of presenting detailed information about public ex-
penditure to the Commons."' In addition to Select Committees of about
15 members, such as those just mentioned, a number of "specialist"
select committees of the Commons have been set up since World War
II to scrutinize the efficiency of various fields of administration, including
the nationalized industries, the Parliamentary Commissioner ("Ombuds-
man"), science and technology, race relations and immigration, Scottish
affairs, and European Community secondary legislation. Practical limits
are set to the creation of select committees by the requirements of staff
and accommodations as well as the availability of members. 55
53. 29 & 30 Vict., c. 39.
54. PUBLIC EXPENDITuRE: A NEw PRESENTATION, CMND. No. 4017 (1969).
55. For a detailed comparison between the British parliamentary system and the
congressional system, see K. BRAnsHAw & D. PiniN, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS (1972).
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Parliamentary privilege, that special branch of English law adminis-
tered by each House through its officers and recognized by the courts,
originally was developed as a protection against the Tudor and Stuart
monarchs and later was used to guard the boundaries between the powers
of the two Houses. It sometimes has been used, however, against the
liberties of the citizen. The right to restrain publication of debates was
regarded as a corollary of' the privilege of freedom of speech in Parlia-
ment. After the case of John Miller in 17715' the Commons ceased to
enforce the orders against publication of reports of debates, but, for some
time after this, reporters could not get seats or take notes, and objection
often was taken to the presence of "strangers." Reporters' galleries were
provided in 1834, parliamentary reports and debates first were published
and sold inexpensively in 1835, and the following year publication of
division lists was permitted. The series of reports known after the origi-
nal reporter as "Hansard" began unofficially in 1803 and later was sub-
sidized by a parliamentary grant. Official publication of debates did not
begin until 1909.
The last confrontation between the Commons and the courts on the
subject of privilege took place in prolonged litigation in which one
Stockdale sued the parliamentary printers for libel, culminating in Stock-
dale v. Hansard,57 tried in 1839 by the Queen's Bench. Immunity from
judicial proceedings no doubt attached to defamatory matter circulated
only among members of Parliament, but in Stockdale, the Commons,
through Hansard, argued that such immunity extended to any papers
printed by order of either House and put on sale to the public. The
Queen's Bench rejected this view and held for Stockdale, adopting the
principle that though the members of the Commons were sole judges as
to whether and how they would enforce a privilege, the court had juris-
diction to decide whether an alleged privilege existed. This decision
never was accepted openly by the Commons, who have kept the resolu-
tions of that time on their journals, but since then they have been sensi-
ble enough to avoid direct challenge to the courts. On the other hand,
because Parliament is unlimited by any constitution, it can make the law
what it wants the law to be, and this it did by the Parliamentary Papers
Act 184058; yet the fact that an act of Parliament was passed vindicates
56. See 2 T. ERSKINE MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 43-49 (1860).
57. 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839); cf. Sheriff of Middlesex, 113 Eng. Rep. 419 (Q.B.
1840) (upholding the contempt power of the House of Commons).
58. 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9.
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the court's decision that the Commons could not change the law by reso-
lution. The distinction between what transpires within the House and
what transpires outside the House also was present in Bradlaugh v. Gos-
sett,-9 in which the high court decided in favor of the Sergeant-at-Arms
in an action brought by the atheist, Charles Bradlaugh. The petitioner
claimed that he had been elected a member for Northampton and that
the Sergeant-at-Arms acted unlawfully by enforcing the House order
excluding him. The Commons, in exercising its privilege to regulate its
internal proceedings, could put its own interpretation on the Parliamen-
tary Oaths Act 1866,6 but the matter would have been different if the
Commons had allowed Bradlaugh to sit and then had purported by reso-
lution to protect him against the statutory penalties that a common in-
former might at that time have claimed against him in the courts.
It is unsatisfactory that the courts and the Houses of Parliamente l
should claim competing jurisdictions in matters that may affect the liberty
of a citizen. This anomaly could be removed if the Commons would al-
low an act to be passed, as they did with the Parliamentary Elections Act
1868,62 transferring to the courts exclusive jurisdiction to punish persons,
or at least members of the public, charged with breach of privilege or
with contempt of Parliament. In this way the issue would be tried by an
impartial tribunal, counsel and witness would be heard, the facts could
be found by a jury, and there could be a right of appeal. A select com-
mittee of the Commons set up in 1966 reviewed the law and practice in
relation to parliamentary privilege; its reports recommended extensive
changes in the parliamentary procedure relating to matters of privilege
and contempt, some of which have been implemented. Although these
changes would minimize conflicts between the House and the courts, the
report did not deal with the more fundamental question of competing
jurisdictions.
The House of Lords
Most ministers sat in the House of Lords in the 18th century, as did
the naval, military, and ecclesiastical leaders of the country. The Lords
59. [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 271.
60. 29 & 30 Viet., c. 19.
61. The privileges of the House of Lords have not been controversial in recent times.
But see Stourton v. Stourton, [1963] P. 302 (1962) (parliamentary privilege protects
husband from attachment by separated wife seeking to have her property returned).
62. 31 & 32 Vict, c. 125.
63. REPoRT FRoM Tm SEcr COMITTm E oN PARLIAmNTARv Pivmu (1967) H.C. 34.
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had a negative power, in that their consent was necessary to legislation,
but they never had the positive power of the Commons, for the latter
was representative of the electors and had the exclusive privilege of in-
troducing financial measures. Peers traditionally had a right of individual
access to the sovereign, but this now is confined in practice to ministers
who are Privy Councilors. Before the Reform Act of 1832,6 most of the
great landowners who controlled parliamentary constituencies were
peers, but the creation of peerages lay with the executive. Until the
middle of the present century, the composition of the House of Lords,
except for the bishops, was based entirely on the hereditary principle,
modified after the Unions by the presence of representative Scottish and
Irish peers,8 5 and after the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876"6 by the
presence of the Law Lords. 7
William IV's short reign was marked by the passing of the Reform
Act of 183268 governing the relationship between the Houses of Parlia-
ment. Although the Lords could not constitutionally amend money bills,
they had the legal power to reject them, though this power was exercised
rarely. In 1860 the Lords rejected a bill to repeal the paper duty, so the
next year Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer, tacked this provision
to a general financial measure for the services of the year, and this the
Lords shrank from rejecting. Other differences between the two Houses
arose over the Irish Church Disestablishment Bill of 1869,"9 the abolition
of the purchase of army commissions in 1872, the Representation of the
People Bill in 1884,70 and Gladstone's Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886.7'
The crisis came after the Liberals were returned to power with an over-
64. Representation of the People Act 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 (repealed).
65. The Peerage Act 1963, c. 48, § 4, repealed the relevant provisions of the Union
with Scotland Act 1706, 6 Anne, c. 11, and allowed all holders of Scottish peerages to
sit and vote. The relevant provisions of the Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3,
c. 67, which were obsolete since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, were
repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1971, c. 52.
66. 39 & 40 Vict., c. 59.
67. Cf. Wensleydale Peerage, 10 Eng. Rep. 1181 (H.L. 1856) (Lords' Committee of
Privileges).
68. Representation of the People Act 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 (repealed). The King,
much against his inclination, supported the bill by threatening to use his prerogative
of creating sufficient peers to carry the measure in the upper House. Adequate absten-
tions, however, made this unnecessary.
69. Bill No. 27 (1868/69), 3 Barr. Srss. PAms 85.
70. Bill No. 119 (1884/85), 6 Barr. SESS. PAPERS 429.
71. Bill No. 181 Sess. 1, (1886), 2 Bart. Srss. Pans 461.
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whelming majority in the Commons in the 1905 election, and the Lords
rejected or drastically amended a number of the principal measures in-
troduced by the government, culminating in the rejection of Lloyd
George's budget in 1909 on the ground that it contained matter inappro-
priate -to a budget. After a general election and the death of Edward VII
in 1910, George V acceded to Asquith's request that, if necessary, a
sufficient number of peers to pass a Parliament bill should be created,
though this was not made public at the time. Another general election
made little difference to the position of the parties, the King's promise
to create additional peers was published, and the Parliament bill was
passed, as the Reform Act had been in 1832, by virtue of a large number
of abstentions. The Parliament Act 1911 in effect limited the Lords'
power to delay a money bill, as strictly defined in the Act, to 1 month,
and limited their power to delay other public bills to 2 years.72 Because
of the self-preserving forbearance of the Lords in seldom directly op-
posing a government bill and in knowing when to compromise on their
proposed amendments, only three acts have been passed without the
formal consent of the second chamber, the most important of which was
the Parliament Act 1949.7' This Act was passed under Attlee's Labor
administration when the government, having secured the enactment of
a series of nationalization acts foreshadowed in their election manifesto,
feared that their bill, not included in that manifesto, to nationalize the
iron and steel industry would be held up by the Lords until the expira-
tion of that Parliament. The effect of the Parliament Act 1949 was to
reduce the power of the Lords to delay a nonmoney bill from 2 years
to 1 year.74 It was part of the compromise in 1911 that the maximum
life of Parliament should be reduced from 7 years' to 5 years, and a
vitally important provision of the Parliament Acts is that the Lords can-
not be overriden on a bill to extend the life of Parliament.7"
New economic and social conditions after World War II meant that
the second chamber was functioning on the regular attendance of per-
haps 80 peers, while hundreds of "backwoodsmen," who were entitled
72. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, 5§ 1, 2, as amended, Parliament Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6,
c. 103. For discussions of the rationale and effect of the Act of 1911, see H. HANHAM,
supra note 6, at 194-99; W. IvOR JENNINGS, PARL msENT 414-34 (2d ed. 1969); H.
NicoLso, supra note 5, at 102-04, 125-39, 148-58.
73. 12 & 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103.
74. Id. § 1.
75. Fixed by the Septennial Act 1715, 1 Geo. 1, Stat. 2, c. 38.
76. Parliament Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 2.
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to sit and vote and who possibly might do so in an emergency, were
absenting themselves in order to earn a living. There is no salary for
peers attending, though since 1957 a daily attendance allowance has been
paid. Efforts to abolish totally the House of Lords have not attracted
more than a small minority since the Restoration. To increase the num-
ber of persons who could be expected in the circumstances of the day to
attend and take part regularly in debates, especially those who are not
Conservatives, the Life Peerages Act 1958 was passed to enable the
Prime Minister to advise the creation of an unlimited number of life
peers and life peeresses entitled to sit and vote. 7 It was intended that the
Prime Minister consult the Leader of the Opposition and accept his sug-
gested nominees, an apparently quixotic measure for a Conservative
government to pass, but based upon a recognition that the British par-
liamentary system depends on the existence of an effective Opposition,
that the Labor party, not rich in hereditary peers, was now one of the
two main parties in the country, and that a minimum number of Labor
peers in the House of Lords was desirable. The Peerage Act 1963 allowed
holders of hereditary peerages to disclaim their peerage for life and be-
come eligible for election to the House of Commons.78 In recent years
the work of the House of Lords has been carried on by about 200 regu-
lar attenders, and since 1964, no new hereditary peerages have been
created.
The functions of the House of Lords in modem times include debat-
ing on motions, taking part in the legislative process subject to the Parlia-
ment Acts, proposing amendments to bills sent up by the Commons,
relieving the Commons of much committee work, especially in relation
to delegated legislation and private (mostly local) bills, and playing a
part in scrutiny of the administration. The upper House acts as a
77. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 21. This Act made possible the first admission of women to the
House of Lords, id., § 1(3), but did not grant this right to hereditary peeresses. See Vis-
countes Rhondda's Clainm, [1922] 2 A.C. 339 (Lords' Committee for Privileges). Heredi-
tary peeresses, who are few in number, became admissible under the Peerage Act 1963,
c. 48, § 6.
78. C. 48, §§ 1, 2. Several prominent politicians have taken advantage of this provision:
Mr. Wedgwood Benn, 2nd Viscount Stansgate. see In re Parliamentary Election for
Bristol South East, [1964] 2 Q.B. 257 (1961); Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 15th Earl of
Home; and Lord Hailsham. Lord Hailsham, 2nd Viscount Hailsham, son of the 1st
Viscount Hailsham who was twice Lord Chancellor, renounced his hereditary peerage
in 1963 to become Quintin Hogg, Member of Parliament. In 1970 he himself was
appointed Lord Chancellor and was granted a life peerage as Lord Hailsham of St.
Marylebone.
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brake on important constitutional innovations, and remains the chief
safeguard against an extension of the life of Parliament at the will of the
elected House alone.
Among the proposals made over the years for further reforming the
composition and powers of the House of Lords are the Bryce Conference
in 191779 and the Conferences of Party Leaders on the Parliament Bills
of 194980 and 1968.81 The Labor Government in 1968 and 1969 at-
tempted to devise a reformed second chamber that would preserve as far
as possible the historical continuity of the House of Lords without inter-
fering with hereditary titles, but also without making the new second
chamber so efficient and powerful as to rival the House of Commons.
The solution adopted was a two-tiered scheme of voting and nonvoting
members. Voting members would be life peers and first holders of
hereditary peerages who wished to take advantage of this qualification
with its attendant duties. Nonvoting members would be those peers by
succession who already had received or applied for a writ of summons
before the legislation had been adopted. Provision would be made to en-
sure that the government of the day would have a small majority of
the party membership, but not an overall majority of the entire member-
ship, including crossbenchers. Although independent peers in theory
would hold the balance of power, they supposedly would not be or-
ganized as a group. The bill also would have reduced the power of the
Lords to delay a nonmoney bill from 1 year to 6 months. Although such
a reduction in the delaying power of the Lords may be considered too
drastic, it is unfortunate that a reform in the composition of the second
chamber that was substantially agreed to by the leaders of each side in
both Houses should not have been enacted. The bill, however, was
dropped because the more extreme backbenchers on both sides of the
Commons revolted on the ground that the government would have too
much patronage and the Prime Minister too much discretion in the
creation of voting peers, who would be paid full salaries.
Ireland and the Union
The constitutional status of Ireland before 1800 is uncertain; for cen-
turies Ireland had been a kingdom belonging to the English Crown, but
whether it was subject to the English Parliament was a different question.
79. CD. No. 9038 (1918).
80. CMD. No. 7380 (1947-48).
81. House oF LoRns R~omu, CMm,. No. 3799 (1968).
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After much vacillation, in 1783 the British Parliament declared that Ire-
land was bound only by laws enacted by its own parliament, and that no
appeals would lie from Irish to British courts . 2 Seventeen years later the
British Parliament passed the Union with Ireland Act 1800,3 and the
Irish Parliament reluctantly passed a corresponding statute, uniting the
two kingdoms into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on
similar terms to the Union of 1707 except that there was no separate sys-
tem of Irish private law. The first breach in the "fundamental" terms of
the Union came with the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in
1869,s to which Queen Victoria was induced to give her assent by being
reminded that her duty as a constitutional monarch was to act on the
advice of her ministers. The Union proved unpopular in Southern Ire-
land, and after long agitation for "home rule" the Government of Ire-
land Act 1914 was passed providing for an Irish Parliament with limited
legislative powers in matters exclusively relating to Ireland and subject
to the overriding authority of the Parliament at Westminster.8 5 The out-
break of World War I forced postponement of the implementation of
the Act. As a result of the Easter, 1916, uprising in Dublin, followed by
"the troubles," and of the unwillingness of the Protestant majority in
the North"' to throw in their lot with the Catholic South, the scheme
had to be recast. After the war, therefore, the Government of Ireland
Act 1920 provided for two subordinate Parliaments for Northern and
Southern Ireland, with a government in each area responsible to its parlia-
ment, the Lord Lieutenant representing the Crown, and a Council of
Ireland forming a bond of union for the purpose of the eventual end of
partition.8 7 This Act was not implemented effectively in Southern Ire-
land, and following the Anglo-Irish "Treaty" of 1921,8 Ireland was
accorded Dominion status similar to that of Canada by the Irish Free
State (Agreement) Act 1922.89
82. 23 Geo. 3, c. 28 (1783).
83. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67.
84. Irish Church Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 42.
85. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 90, § 1, 2, repealed, Government of Ireland Act 1920, 10 & 11
Geo. 5, c. 67, § 76(2).
86. The Protestant majority is the effect of the Plantation in James I's reign, consisting
largely of Scottish Presbyterians.
87. 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, §§ 1, 2.
88. Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6,
1921, CmDi. No. 1560 (1921), 26 L.N.T.S. 10.
89. 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 4.
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Northern Ireland, comprising six of the eight counties of Ulster,"°
however, exercised its option to remain in the United Kingdom under
the terms of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. 11 That Act, as
amended, remained the basis of the constitution of Northern Ireland for
the next 50 years.92 Under it, Northern Ireland had a subordinate parlia-
ment at Stormont with a large measure of legislative and administrative
devolution, though the Governor represented the Crown and appeals in
civil and criminal cases lay to the House of Lords. When, after World
War II, the Irish Free State (Eire) was recognized by the British Parlia-
ment as the independent Republic of Ireland by the Ireland Act 1949,9"
the Act declared that Northern Ireland remained part of His Majesty's
dominions and part of the United Kingdom, and affirmed that in no
event would any part of Northern Ireland cease to be part of the
United Kingdom "without the consent of the Parliament of Northern
Ireland." 94
When, however, sectarian strife on a serious scale broke out in 1969,
especially in the suburbs of Belfast, its continuance necessitated the use
of statutory emergency powers and the employment of troops to main-
tain order. The Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended and direct
government from Whitehall was imposed by the Northern Ireland
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1972,"' which confirmed the declaration
contained in the Ireland Act 1949. A referendum held in Northern Ire-
land in March, 1973, resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of
the province remaining in the United Kingdom. The Northern Ireland
Constitution Act 1973 abolished the Stormont Parliament,9" replaced it
by an assembly to be elected by a kind of proportional representation, 7
and declared in section 1 that the status of Northern Ireland would not
be changed "without the consent of the majority of the people of North-
ern Ireland voting in a poll." 9 The principle of executive "power shar-
ing" between the different parties did not work, and the assembly, in
90. Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone.
91. 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67.
92. H. CALvERT, CONSTrrUTONAL LAW IN NORTHER IrELA N (1968).
93. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 41. Section 5 of the Act provides that citizens of the Republic
of Ireland should not be regarded as aliens. They therefore may vote in parliamentary
and local elections in the United Kingdom if ordinarily resident there.
94. Id. § 1(2).
95. C. 22, § 1. See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
96. C. 36, § 31.
97. Id. § 28.
98. Id. § 1.
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its turn, was abolished' by the Northern Ireland Act 1974, which pro-
vided for the holding of a constitutional convention, and confirmed the
declaration contained in section 1 of the Act of 1973.100
It is unclear whether the United Kingdom Parliament is bound by the
declaration of the Act of 1974. The history of both the Scottish and the
Irish Unions shows that "fundamental" provisions have not been re-
garded as binding, and the orthodox doctrine of the legislative supremacy
of Parliament concedes the inability of Parliament to limit its own pow-
ers. Further, despite obiter dicta in the Scottish case of MacCormick v.
Lord Advocate'' indicating that certain fundamental terms of the union
with Scotland may represent a higher law binding on Parliament, it ap-
pears that no court in the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to declare
an act of Parliament void.
Britain and the European Community
Mr. Edward Heath, then a minister in Mr. Harold Macmillan's Con-
servative government, began strenuous, though unsuccessful, negotiations
in 1962 for the entry of the United Kingdom into the European
Economic Community. Mr. Wilson's Labor government, from 1968
to 1970, resumed the negotiations as an important aspect of its pol-
icy, but was overtaken by the general election of 1970, which
brought Mr. Heath into office as Prime Minister. In an about-face, the
Labor party announced its opposition to membership in the Community.
Mr. Heath's government resumed the negotiations and in January, 1972,
signed the accession treaty at Brussels,10 2 which Parliament implemented
by the European Communities Act 1972.13 The Commonwealth coun-
tries most concerned, notably Australia and New Zealand, intimated that
they favored Britain entering the Common Market, and a substantial
majority in the House of Commons, on a free vote, favored the principle
of entry. After the Act was passed the Labor Opposition declared its
intention, if returned to power, to "renegotiate the terms of entry,"
which actually would have required renegotiation of the terms of con-
tinued membership. At the general election of February, 1974, which
99. C. 28, § 2. The constitutional convention has since been dissolved.
100. Id. § 2 (7). See note 98 supra & accompanying text.
101. [1953] Sess. Cas. 396.
102. Treaty of Accession, [1973] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (CAM. 5179-I), 2 CCH COMM.
MwT. REP. 7011 (1972).
103. C. 68.
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Labor won, Mr. Wilson confirmed this policy, stating that if the
renegotiation were unsuccessful, the existing treaty obligations would
not be regarded as binding. International lawyers generally, and Com-
munity lawyers in particular, no doubt would take the view that with-
drawal without good cause and without the agreement of all the member
states would be a serious breach of treaty obligations. Although under
British constitutional law Parliament doubtless could repeal the European
Communities Act and unscramble a considerable part of the commercial,
industrial, and agricultural law of the country, that would be inconsis-
tent with the convention that a government succeeds to the international
obligations of its predecessors.
A referendum on the Community membership issue was a possibility,
but the holding of a referendum traditionally has been regarded as "un-
English" and inconsistent with the principle that members are elected
to Parliament to exercise their informed judgment on behalf of their
constituents. There is also the suspicion that the result may be affected by
the way the question is put, which is necessarily oversimplified any-
way.104 The Labor party, and even ministers inside and outside the Cabi-
net, were seriously divided over the issue of membership. Mr. Wilson,
who initially opposed the holding of a referendum, therefore found it
expedient to announce at the general election of October, 1974, that if
the government were satisfied with the result of renegotiation, the issue
would be put to the people either in a referendum or at another general
election. Labor returned to office in October, 1974, and renegotiated in
Brussels to the satisfaction of the government. A referendum, unique for
the United Kingdom, was held under the Referendum Act 1975105 in
June, 1975, after a short campaign in which hardly anything was said
about the actual results of renegotiation. An overall majority of more
than two-thirds voted in favor of continued membership, with smaller
favorable majorities in Scotland and Wales.
Both Houses of Parliament have set up select committees to cope with
the intricate problems of European secondary legislation. This legislation
imposes self-executing regulations, which take effect directly within the
United Kingdom as a member state and take precedence over local law
104. During the discussions on the Parliament bill in 1910, however, Lord Lansdowne,
leader of the Conservative peers, proposed that when a bill sent up by the Commons
had been rejected three times by the Lords, the matter should be decided by referen-
dum. A referendum was held in Northern Ireland in March, 1973, on whetherNorthern
Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom.
105. C. 33.
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in certain fields.106 The select committees also deal with delegated legis-
lation passed under statutory authority to give effect to Community
directives. Ministers remain responsible to Parliament for Community
affairs as they affect the United Kingdom, but those attending the Com-
munity Council cannot be bound closely in advance of decisions being
negotiated, and may not be entirely free to inform Parliament of the
factors leading to such decisions. The unanimity principle, however, is
applied at present by the Council in important matters, and could not
be abrogated without the agreement of the United Kingdom. Conse-
quently, as ministers depend on the support of Parliament, they would
not agree to anything that Parliament was unlikely to favor.
Devolution Within Great Britain
Although outwardly the United Kingdom has followed the recent
trend in favor of supranational organizations by joining a wider Euro-
pean Community, inwardly Scottish and Welsh nationalism is calling for
smaller, rather than larger, governmental units. Thus the gradual trans-
formation of Empire into Commonwealth may be followed by a more
sudden disintegration of the United Kingdom itself. This movement to
which the Kilbrandon Report107 has given impetus is not so novel as may
be thought. Legislative devolution for Scotland and Wales, as well as for
Ireland, has been discussed since 1885 when the Scottish Office was estab-
lished. Before World War I the Liberal government seriously considered
devolution as an item of policy. Winston Churchill, while Home Secre-
tary in 1911, submitted to the Cabinet an outline plan as a basis for dis-
cussion, in which elected legislative and administrative bodies would be
set up for Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and seven areas of England, though
he saw that an English parliament alongside the Imperial Parliament was
impracticable. Likewise, Prime Minister Asquith, in a 1912 House of
Commons speech on the Government of Ireland Bill, said that provisions
similar to those in the Government of Ireland Bill then under considera-
tion were needed for England, Scotland, and Wales, to free the Imperial
106. Courts of member states are to apply the interpretation given the treaty and
other Community laws by the Court of Justice of the European Community. Van Duyn
v. Home Office, [1974] 1 WL.R. 1107 (Ch.) (referring the case to the European
court); Van Duyn v. Home Office, 2 CCH Comm. Mxi. REP,. 8283 (1974); H.P.
Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger SA, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 202 (CA.) (upholding application
of principles of interpretation used by the European court).
107. See note 111 infra & accompanying text.
1976]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Parliament from local concerns and burdens. l 8 After World War I, the
Commons approved a broad scheme for subordinate legislatures for Eng-
land, Scotland, and Wales, leaving open the question of subdividing
England, but nothing came of it at the time.
Nationalism in Scotland and Wales first became a serious electoral
issue at the general election of 1966, when the Nationalist parties received
the votes of 20 percent of the electorate in those countries. Neither the
Conservative nor the Labor party strongly favored devolution, but with
the politician's desire for votes these parties at least had to appear to take
nationalist aspirations seriously. Mr. Heath, Conservative opposition
leader, in a speech to Scottish Conservatives in May, 1968, put forward
the idea of a Scottish assembly, and in August of that year he appointed
an independent committee under the chairmanship of Sir Alec Douglas-
Home to work out proposals. The committee recommended establishing
a Scottish assembly in Edinburgh to undertake certain stages of Scottish
bills passing through Parliament,"" but it is doubtful whether this would
have made much difference, because a body acting in effect as a legisla-
tive committee of Parliament would have to conform to the general
parliamentary procedure.110
In 1969, the Labor government, holding more seats in Scotland and
Wales than any other party, appointed a Royal Commission on the
Constitution under the chairmanship of Lord Crowther and then, on his
death, of Lord Kilbrandon, a distinguished Scottish judge. The
scope of inquiry of the Commission, though fairly wide, was taken
as being limited to the question of devolution. The Royal Com-
mission Report,"' popularly known as the Kilbrandon Report, ap-
peared in 1973. After returning to power in June, 1974, the Labor
government issued a consultative document, 12 which was followed
108. H. HANHAM, supra note 6, at 133.
109. SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT: REPORT OF THE SCOTTISH CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE
(Scottish Constitutional Committee, 1970); Walker, The Constitution and the Proposed
Scottish Convention, 1970 ScoTs LAW TIMES 117; see J. IIACKINTOSH, THE DEVOLUTION
OF POWER (1968).
110. Bradley, Devolution of Government in Britain-Some Scottish Aspects, in
DEVOLuTnON 100-01 (H. Calvert ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as DEVOI.UTION].
111. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 1969-1973: VOL. I REPORT, CMND. No.
5460 (1973); VOL. II MEMORANDUM OF DISSENT, CMND. No. 5460-I (1973); see Watson,
The Royal Conmission on the Constitution, 3 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 290 (1974).
112. DEVOLUTION WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM: SoME ALTERNATIVES FOx DISCUSSION
(1974).
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in September, 1974, by a white paper"13 outlining the decision of
the government on some of the main questions presented by the
Kilbrandon Report. The government agreed with the Royal Com-
mission in rejecting separatism and federalism, and in regarding the
maintenance of the political and economic unity of the United King-
dom as a vital and fundamental principle; they noted that there already
had been a substantial amount of administrative devolution from London
to Scotland, Wales, and the English regions. A number of important
questions still remained to be resolved with regard to such matters as fi-
nance and economic management, trade, industry and employment, local
government, the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales, and repre-
sentation in the United Kingdom Parliament, but the government ac-
cepted the broad conclusion of the Kilbrandon Commission that a further
substantial measure of devolution was desirable, and that it best could
be achieved by the establishment of directly elected assemblies in both
Scotland and Wales. Because Scotland has a separate judicial system and
its own private and administrative law, the government proposed that
the Scottish assembly have legislative powers within fields in which
separate Scottish legislation already exists, such as housing, health, and
education. A Welsh assembly also would be created that would
parallel the Scottish counterpart in assuming certain powers of the Secre-
tary of State regarding delegated legislation, and that would be given re-
sponsibility for many of the executive functions at present carried out by
nominated bodies within Wales and by the Secretary of State himself.
A second white paper was published by the Labor government in
November, 1975,114 and it was expected that a bill embodying its pro-
posals, subject to revision after consultation with opposition party mem-
bers, would be introduced in Parliament within a year and put into effect
by 1978."5 Scotland, it was proposed, would be given a lawmaking as-
sembly in Edinburgh with a cabinet-type government and a chief execu-
tive. By proposing a Welsh assembly limited to executive functions, the
113. DEMOCRACY AND DEvoLUmON: PROPOSALS FOR SCOTLAND AND WALES, CMND. No.
5653 (1974).
114. OUR CHANGING DEMOCRACY: DEVOLUTION TO SCOTLAND AND WALES, CMND. No.
6348 (1975). The white paper is reprinted in part in The Times (London), Nov. 28,
1975, at 4, col. I. For commentary on the proposals, see id., Nov. 28, 1975, at 2, col. 4;
id., Nov. 28, 1975, at I, col. 1; id., Nov. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id., Nov. 28, 1975, at 1,
col. 1; id., Nov. 28, 1975, at 2, col. 4.
115. The Times (London), Nov. 28, 1975, at 1, coL 1.
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white paper resolved a division among the members of the earlier Royal
Commission in favor of a more limited form of devolution for Wales.
The assemblies would have power over local government, health, per-
sonal social services, schools, housing, roads, environment, and many
aspects of physical planning. The system of election would not be pro-
portional, and the Scottish and Welsh assemblies would consist of 142
and 72 members respectively, 2 members to be elected from each .con-
stituency for 4-year terms. Laws passed by the assemblies would be
funded by block grants from Parliament and from surcharges on local
taxes; the government would retain the power to intervene if the assem-
blies exceeded their power. In accord with what was considered an
"essential" provision of the earlier white paper, Scotland and Wales
would retain their existing number of seats in Parliament. This is puzz-
ling because Scotland and Wales already are overrepresented in Parlia-
ment in terms of population, and there would be nothing to prevent
Scottish and Welsh members from voting on purely English affairs. The
proposals were condemned strongly by the opposition parties; Conserv-
atives felt it went too far, and Liberals, joined by some extreme devolu-
tionists on the Labor back benches, believed it had not gone far enough.
In light of the poor reception of the proposals and the announcement
that they were amendable after consultation, it is impossible to predict
what form devolution ultimately will take, but an assembly with some
legislative powers for Scotland is almost a foregone conclusion.""
Scotland is unique in the United Kingdom in having separate judicial
and administrative systems but no separate legislature. During the Kil-
brandon deliberations Scottish nationalism was quiescent, but it revived
with the discovery of North Sea oil. Although the oil reserves are lo-
cated somewhat nearer to Scotland than to England, requiring land in-
stallations to be predominantly in Scotland, control of the oil will be
vested by Parliament in a United Kingdom corporation. North Sea oil
is not included in the list of matters for the Scottish assembly, the
official view being that British economic and industrial development
should not be devolved. There have been many changes in the law since
the Scottish Union, notably the numerous statutory regulations controll-
ing areas of private life and local administration; Lord Kilbrandon re-
cently expressed the opinion that the matters proposed for legislation by
the Scottish assembly would have been expected by Scotland and agreed
116. For a summary of the proposals and reactions to them, see id.
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to by England in 1706.117 It is unfortunate, however, that shortly before
the publication of the Kilbrandon Report, major schemes of local gov-
ernment reorganization were introduced on both sides of the
border. Apart from the unsettling effect of devolution on a new
system of local government, it is questionable whether there is
room for another tier between national and local government.
This is particularly true of Scotland, where one new local au-
thority, Strathclyde, contains 40 percent of the population of that
country. Further, it may be asked whether there is sufficient evidence
that a widespread sense of lack of participation and communication, and
concomitant grievance and frustration, necessarily are confined to the
boundaries of Scotland and Wales, and whether these beliefs differ sig-
nificantly from those in the various English regions. Even if they do,
devolution may not be the appropriate solution. The crux of the
problem may involve the provision of sufficient control over the national
administration to prevent the abuse of power. Even if some form of de-
volution is desirable to check discontent, it is unlikely that schemes of
devolution motivated by party political advantage will cure the real
ills."" With regard to W~ales, the major issue has been whether its as-
sembly should have legislative powers or only executive functions. Not
only has Wales no separate legal system, but it has been integrated politi-
cally with England for centuries; it therefore may be argued that selec-
tive legislative devolution for Wales hardly would work satisfactorily
unless similar arrangements were made for the English regions.'
Divisions in England coincide more with socioeconomic groups rep-
resented by the political parties than with regional boundaries, making
it questionable whether a genuine regional consciousness exists in Eng-
land. A number of alternative schemes of devolution for England, or for
the English regions, have been suggested and shelved; devolution does
not appear particularly to interest the English people.
THE BRITISH EMPiRE AND COMMONWEALTH
The American Declaration of Independence brought the first British
Empire to an end, but the ubiquitous activities of British explorers, fol-
117. Address by Lord Kilbrandon, A Background to Constitutional Reform, Holds-
worth Club, Faculty of Law, University of Birmingham, England, 1975, 18-20.
118. See DEVOLu-nON, supra note 110, chs. 1, 2, 4 (H. Calvert ed. 1975).
119. Williams, Wales and Legislative -Devolution, in DEVOLuTrON, supra note 110, at
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lowed by missionaries, traders, and then antislave traders, obliged Britain
to try to establish ordered government in all quarters of the globe. The
continued growth of the Empire was a historical accident, arising either
from settlement in newly discovered lands or from the first contin-
uous contacts between Europeans and underdeveloped peoples. The
politico-economic concept of the Empire was not conceived until Joseph
Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary at the turn of the present cen-
tury, and the retention of the Empire was never first on the list of Brit-
ish priorities. The period from the loss of the 13 North American
colonies to the development of colonial self-government in the middle of
the 19th century has been called the "second British Empire." The main
common law principles relating to colonial government were established
by the middle of the 18th century, notably in the case of Campbell v.
Hail.120 Later constitutional changes were effected mainly by the de-
velopment of usages, though there were a few important statutes, includ-
ing the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865121 and the British Settlements
Act 1887.122 The term "third British Empire" has been used to describe
the period of the development of self-government in certain colonies,
including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, from the middle of the
19th century until the formal recognition of "dominion status" by the
Statute of Westminster 1931.123 From that time, as the association be-
tween the United Kingdom and the other territories over which the
Crown exercised some degree of control 24 has become less and less
formal and hierarchical, it has come to be known as the British Common-
wealth of Nations, 25 the British Commonwealth, or simply the Com-
monwealth. 26 The overseas territories of the Empire or Commonwealth
fall into various legal categories. Apart from colonies, strictly defined,
76. See Price, The Kilbrandon Report on the Constitution and Wales, 1974 CAMmAul
L. REv. 72.
120. 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B. 1774).
121. 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63.
122. 50 & 51 Vict., c. 54.
123. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4.
124. This expression is intended to cover protectorates, protected states, and trust
territories.
125. Lord Rosebery in 1884 in a speech in Australia said: "the Empire is a Common-
wealth of Nations"; Lionel Curtis, a journalist, coined the expression "British Common-
wealth of Nations."
126. General Smuts, the South African statesman, popularized the expressions "the
British Commonwealth" and "the Commonwealth."
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and the Dominions as defined in the Statute of Westminster 193 1,1'7 there
were protectorates, protected states, trust territories, and British India,
earlier called the Indian Empire, now represented by India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh.
The Queen and the Commonwealth
The Queen, as Head of the Commonwealth, is the symbol of Com-
monwealth association. The convention recited in the preamble to the
Statute of Westminster requires that an alteration by the United King-
dom Parliament in the law touching the succession to the throne should
have the assent of the parliaments of all the Dominions or realms owing
allegiance to the Crown. 1 8 These bodies also presumably would need to
pass their own legislation to make such an alteration effective in their own
countries. On the accession of Queen Elizabeth II in 1952, proclamations
were issued in the independent countries of the Commonwealth, which,
except for that of New Zealand, differed from that issued in the United
Kingdom in that they referred to Her Majesty specifically as Queen of
their respective countries.
The common law doctrine was that the Crown was one and indivisible
throughout the King's dominions.12 Although there is only one Queen
with various national tides, and one Head of the Commonwealth, there
are in one sense as many "Crowns" as there are independent governments
in the nonrepublican parts of the Commonwealth. Within nonrepublican
federations, however, the Crown is regarded as indivisible for certain pur-
poses. In international law the Crown is divisible; it is possible for the
Crown to be at war with respect to some Commonwealth countries and
at peace with respect to others. In World War II, for example, some
Commonwealth countries made separate declarations of war against
Germany and Japan, while Eire, now the Republic of Ireland, but then
a dominion, remained neutral throughout. Since the war, members of
the Commonwealth have not been able to agree on a common foreign
policy, differing over the Suez Canal intervention in 1956 and over the
recognition of the People's Republic of China.
127. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 1.
128. The convention recited in the preamble to the Statute of Westminster would
seem to extend to more recently independent members of the Commonwealth, unless
they are republics.
129. Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co., 28 Commw. L.R. 129 (Austl.
1920); Williams v. Howarth, [1905] A.C. 551 (P.C.).
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Colonial Law down to the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865
There is a tendency to think of the British Empire or Commonwealth
over the years as consisting wholly or mainly of "colonies," and to speak
of British policy in relation to overseas territories as being a "colonial"
policy. Since American independence, however, this has been inaccurate;
the colonization of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand by development
of settlements must be contrasted to the acquisition by cession or annexa-
tion of the Indian Empire with its enormous population during the 18th
and 19th centuries, 130 and to the vast areas covered by the protectorates
declared in Africa in the latter part of the past century.
A British colony may be defined as any part of the royal dominions, ex-
cluding the British Isles.' 3 ' Protectorates, protected states, and trust terri-
tories, however, were never part of the dominions of the Crown. British
India was excluded by statute from the definition of colony, 32 though
limitations on its legislature were similar to those imposed upon colonial
legislatures; later statutes have excluded from the definition independent
members of the Commonwealth, their provinces or states, and states asso-
ciated with the United Kingdom. 8 Persons born in a British colony
were at common law natural born British subjects, and are now citizens
of the United Kingdom and Colonies.8 4 The basis of the legal system of
a colony was determined 35 by whether the colony was acquired by set-
130. The Crown shared governmental powers in India after statutes of 1773 with the
East India Company, originally incorporated by royal charter in 1600. After the Indian
Mutiny the East India Company was abolished in 1858, and its territories passed under
the exclusive sovereignty of the Crown acting through the Governor-General or Viceroy
in Council, and responsible to the Imperial Parliament through the Secretary of State for
India. Queen Victoria, in effect, succeeded to the position of the Mogul Emperors,
receiving the title of Empress on Disraeli's initiative, and exercising suzerainty over
hundreds of Indian ruling princes.
131. The British Islands include the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Interpreta-
tion Act 1889,52 & 53 Vict., c. 63, § 18(1).
132. Id. § 18(3).
133. Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, §§ 1, 11 (excluding Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland from
the definition); West Indies Act 1967, c. 4.
134. British Nationality Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 4.
135. Whicker v. Hume, 11 Eng. Rep. 50 (H.L. 1858) (English mortmain statute does
not apply to New South Wales); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774)
(English law of trespass and false imprisonment applied to a governor of Minorca for
injury to a Minorquin committed in Minorca); Blankard v. Galdy, 91 Eng. Rep.
356 (K.B. 1693) (establishing the principle that when an uninhabited country is settled
by English subjects, all English laws are in force there, but when a colony is conquered,
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tlement,"'3 by conquest,'137 or by cession,3 8 though in some cases the his-
torical facts were confused and uncertain and the legal system of a
colony might be changed from time to time by legislation.139 Since
American independence, legislation by the United Kingdom Parliament
concerning colonies usually has been confined to constitutional changes
affecting more than one colony or creating or dissolving'a federation, 140
or to matters of general concern such as admiralty jurisdiction, mer-
chant shipping, currency, nationality, citizenship, and extradition of fugi-
tive offenders within the Commonwealth. A convention established in
the middle of the 19th century, that Parliament would not legislate con-
cerning Canada, Australia, or New Zealand without their consent, was
extended in the present century to more recently self-governing colonies,
such as Southern Rhodesia, Malta, and the Gold Coast. In other cases
in which parliamentary legislation concerning colonies is considered
necessary or desirable, it is accomplished by means of statutory orders
in council.
Because the Crown at common law had no direct lawmaking power
over settled colonies, it was found expedient to pass the British Settle-
ments Act 188714 to authorize the Crown to make laws by order in
council for sparsely populated settlements that had not been granted
representative institutions, such as the Falkland Islands and certain set-
dements on the west coast of Africa. This power later was used to legis-
late for the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, and Malacca). For
conquered or ceded colonies, on the other hand, the Crown has a pre-
rogative to legislate by order in council, proclamation, or letters patent,
including the power to establish any kind of constitution. Lord Mans-
field held in Campbell v. Hall, 42 however, that when an elected assem-
bly has been granted to a colony, the prerogative to make laws cannot
be exercised while such a grant is in force, as that would be repugnant
to the grant. On the other hand, it was held more recently by the Privy
English law does not become effective until so declared by the conqueror or his suc-
cessors). See K. ROBERTs-WRAY, COMMON-.EALTH AND COLONIAL LAW (1966).
136. Such as' the North American colonies, except Quebec, and the Australian colo-
nies.
137. For example, Aden and Ashanti.
138. Including Quebec, Malta, and Fiji.
139. Thus, for example, Roman-Dutch law was adopted in Southern Rhodesia.
140. Such as statutes relating to Canada, Australia. and the British West Indies.
141. 50 & 51 Vict., c. 54.
142. 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (K.B. 1774) (concerning the imposition of a duty on the
export of sugar from Grenada).
19761 457
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Council, in Sarmnmt v. Strickland,48 that if representative institutions
are revoked validly, the prerogative to legislate for the colony revives
even though no power of resumption has been reserved expressly.
Otherwise, the Privy Council held, the colony would be left without
lawmaking authority unless and until the Imperial Parliament intervened.
Colonial legislatures are subordinate lawmaking bodies, whose powers
depend on the act of Parliament, order in council, or letters patent con-
ferring them. Although the scope of power of a colonial legislature is
restricted, within those bounds the legislature is unrestricted and does
not act as an agent or delegate.'" The earlier common law rule was the
rather vague one that a colonial act was invalid if repugnant to English
law. In the 1860's, a controversy arose in South Australia when Judge
Boothby held invalid certain acts passed by the legislature of South Aus-
tralia, some on the ground that they were contrary to English law and
others because the Governor had not followed his instructions by reserv-
ing them for the royal pleasure, that is, the assent of the Secretary of
State. Following addresses from the two houses of the South Australian
Parliament asking for the judge's removal, the Secretary of State con-
sulted with the English Law Officers, and Parliament passed the Colonial
Laws Validity Act 1865,45 which was intended to be declaratory and
not restrictive. The Act still is in force in relation to colonies and, for his-
torical reasons, the Australian states. Section 2 provides that a colonial
law repugnant to any act of Parliament or to any order or regulation
made thereunder, extending to the colony concerned or to colonies gen-
erally, shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void146; section 3, how-
ever, makes clear that a colonial law is not void on the ground that it is
contrary to English common law or to a British statute not applying to
colonies. 47 Failure by a Governor to observe instructions to reserve
certain classes of bills for the royal pleasure does not invalidate his assent
to a bill, unless these instructions actually are embodied in the constitu-
tion of the colony. 48 The power of a colonial legislature to establish
143. [1939] A.C. 678 (P.C.) (concerning the imposition of import duties in Malta
after Parliament had provided for the revocation of the self-governing constitution of
Malta).
144. Powell v. Apollo Candle Co, [18851 10 App. Cas. 282 (P.C.) (upholding a New
South Wales customs regulation act); Hodge v. The Queen, [1883] 9 App. Cas. 117
(P.C.) (upholding an Ontario liquor license statute).
145. 28 & 29 Vict, c. 63.
146. Id. § 2.
147. Id. § 3.
148. Id. § 4.
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courts of justice is confirmed by section 5, which declares that every
"representative" colonial legislature has power to make laws respecting
the constitution, powers, and procedure of such legislature, provided that
such laws are passed in such "manner and form" as may from time to
time be required by any law in force in the colony.149
Development of Dominion Status150
The development of responsible government in the colonies originated
in 1839 in the report sent from North America by Lord Durham to the
British government. Upper and lower Canada already had representative
assemblies; the thrust of Lord Durham's report was that, as a necessary
consequence of the grant of representative institutions, the Governor
should entrust the administration to such men as could command a ma-
jority. In other words, responsible government should be introduced, and
this could be effected simply by a change in the Governor's instructions.
Responsible government accordingly was introduced into the united col-
onies of Ontario and Quebec. Sir Charles Bagot as Governor, in 1842 to
1845, added French-Canadians and Radicals to moderates in the council,
and in 1848, Lord Elgin as Governor-General accepted party lines as the
basis for a Canadian ministry. Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New
Brunswick, and Newfoundland followed along similar lines. Full auto-
nomy in internal affairs gradually was supplemented by a degree of
autonomy in external affairs. Implicit in the British North America Act
1867 was the existence of responsible government in the new federal
Dominion of Canada.5 After 1850, the same principles were extended
to New South Wales, Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria, Queens-
land, 5 2 and New Zealand,'m to the South African colonies during the
latter part of the 19th cenuzy, to the new federal Commonwealth of
Australia in 1900,1 4 to the new Union of South Africa in 19 0 9,1" and
149. Id. § 5. A representative legislature is one in which at least half the members
are elected by inhabitants of the colony. Id. § 1.
150. For discussions and documents concerning the development of dominion status,
see A. KEITH, SPacHsS AND DoctmNrEs oN THE BRITISH DommNoNs 1918-1931 (1935);
K. WHnERa, THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER AND DOMINION STATus (1932).
151. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
152. Australian Constitutions Act 1850, 13 & 14 Vict, c. 59.
153. New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, 15 & 16 Vict, c. 72.
154. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12. The
federation includes New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western
Australia, and Tasmania.
155. South Africa Act 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 9.
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to the Irish Free State when granted "dominion status" in 1922.1"6 The
autonomy of these dominions received further impetus by their recogni-
tion as separate members of the League of Nations after World War I.
The Balfour Declaration of 1926157 described the position and mutual
relations of the United Kingdom and the dominions at that time as:
"autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in
no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or
external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and
freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Na-
tions." 158 The mutual relations between the autonomous members of
what had become known as the British Commonwealth were regarded
as governed, not by international law, but largely by usages whose char-
acter was something between international law and constitutional law.
These conventions included both legislative autonomy and executive
autonomy, which involved the Governor-General's acting on the advice
of the dominion government, the principle that a dominion could not
be bound by a treaty entered into by the Crown without its consent, and
the choice of Governor-General by the dominion government. Largely at
the instigation of South Africa and the Irish Free State, it was agreed that
the United Kingdom Parliament should pass an act to reconcile the law
relating to legislative powers with the conventional status of the do-
minions.169 After careful study by legal representatives of the various
countries concerned in a Conference on the Operation of Dominion
Legislation in 1929,160 and following resolutions adopted by the Imperial
Conference of 1930,161 the Statute of Westminster 1931162 was passed.
Some of the more important conventions, as well as the request and con-
sent of all the dominions to the passing of the Statute, were recited in the
preamble. Section 2 of the Statute repealed the Colonial Laws Validity
Act 1865'63 in relation to future dominion legislation, and provided, out
156. Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922, 13 Geo. 5, c. 1.
157. REPORT OF ImPERAL CREN CE, Cmn. No. 2768 (1926).
158. Id.
159. Then encompassing Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa,
the Irish Free State, and Newfoundland.
160. CmDr. No. 3479 (1929-30).
161. Cmr. No. 3717 (1930-31).
162. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4. The title of the Statute was suggested by Sir Maurice
Gwyer, then Solicitor-General and a member of the Conference on the Operation of
Dominion Legislation, and later Chief Justice of India. The Statute never came into
operation in Newfoundland, which became a province of Canada.
163. 26 & 27 Vict., c. 76
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of an abundance of caution, that no future dominion legislation would be
void on the ground of repugnancy either to English common law or to
existing or future acts of the United Kingdom Parliament. Section 3
"declared and enacted" that dominion parliaments have full power to
make laws having extraterritorial operation.'" The celebrated section 4
provides that no act of the United Kingdom Parliament passed after
the Statute shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a dominion, as part
of the law of that dominion, unless it expressly is declared in the act that
the dominion has requested and consented to its enactment. This section
applies only to subsequent acts, for otherwise the basis of the constitu-
tion of a dominion and much of the rest of its law would have ceased to
have effect; a dominion wishing to repeal a previous act of the United
Kingdom Parliament applying to it, however, can do so by virtue of
section 2 of the Statute.
Because Australia did not strongly favor the Statute of Westminster,
and because New Zealand probably preferred that it not be enacted,
sections 2 through 6'15 were made adoptive in respect to those two do-
minions. Australia adopted the sections on the entry of Japan into the
war in 1942,16 and New Zealand did so in 1947.67 The absence of
power on the part of the Canadian Parliament to amend the Canadian
Constitution was preserved 68 unless and until the federation and the
provinces could agree on how the distribution of powers among them
should be made internally amendable.6 9 The existing restrictions on the
power of the Australian Parliament to amend the Australia Constitution
164. It has been held that such power already existed under the British North
America Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91. Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156 (P.C.
1932) (upholding Canadian statute providing for seizure of vessels hovering within
12 miles of the Canadian coast with dutiable goods aboard). But see Macleod v. Atty-
Gen. for New South Wales, [1891] A.C. 455, 458 (P.C.) (dicta stating that a bigamy
law applicable to marriages outside of New South Wales would be beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the colony).
165. Section 5 dealt with merchant shipping and section 6 with admiralty courts.
166. Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942, 5 & 6 Geo. 6, No. 56 (Australia).
167. Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, No. 38 (New
Zealand).
168. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7.
169. The British North America (No. 2) Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 81, amending
the British North America Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91(1), passed at the request
and with the consent of Canada, conferred on the Canadian Parliament the power of
constitutional amendment by means of ordinary legislation, with certain exceptions
relating to provincial rights and the meeting and duration of parliament.
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Act, as well as the existing rights of the Australian states,"" also were
preserved, as were the limits, if any, on the power of constitutional
amendment in New ZealandY.17 When New Zealand adopted sections 2
through 6 of the Statute of Westminster in 1947, it asked for and ob-
tained an act of Parliament giving it complete constituent powers.7 2
Colonial Development Since World War H
The stated central purpose of British colonial policy at the end of
World War H was to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-
government within the Commonwealth under conditions that would en-
sure the people of both a fair standard of living and freedom from op-
pression from any quarter. This statement of policy was reiterated in
subsequent years by successive Secretaries of State regardless of party;
in 1960 Prime Minister Macmillan gave dramatic recognition to African
national consciousness by his "wind of change" speech delivered in Cape
Town. A minimum size first was stipulated as a prerequisite of
independence, but since the grant of independence to Cyprus in 1960"13
smallness in itself no longer has been considered an objection to indepen-
dence.
There have been almost as many varieties of colonial legislatures as
colonies, and over the years their constitutions have been subject to fre-
quent change. Typical postwar tendencies have been to confer legislative
councils on colonies that had no legislative body; to turn majorities of
official members into majorities of unofficial members, elected minorities
into elected majorities, and assemblies with elected majorities into assem-
blies wholly elected; to substitute universal adult suffrage, with racial
quotas in mixed populations, for property or educational franchise quali-
fications; and to confer an increasing degree of self-government, especial-
ly regarding internal affairs, on colonies with elected assemblies.
In the executive sphere there have been parallel developments. Execu-
tive councils commonly consisted at first of officials serving ex officio or
170. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12,
§§ 1-8, provides for an indissoluble federation under the Crown of the United Kingdom,
and makes no provision for amendment by the Australian Parliament. The alteration of
the constitution, id., § 9, requires a special kind of referendum; the distribution of
powers between the federation (the Commonwealth of Australia) and the states leaves
the residue of the existing powers to the states.
171. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 8.
172. New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 4, § 1.
173. The Cyprus Act 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 52.
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nominated by the Governor. Nominated unofficial members soon were
introduced, the unofficial element grew, and nomination was made on
the recommendation of the legislative council. The function of an exec-
utive council in what were formerly known as "crown colonies" was
advisory only. When a legislature becomes representative (that is, has
an elected majority) the unofficial members of the executive council wfi
probably be members of the legislature and leaders of opinion there, so
the Governor will try to avoid acting against their unanimous advice.
The introduction of the ministerial system involves the Governor's as-
signing unofficial members of the executive council as ministers of de-
partments. The Governor then is instructed to act on the advice
of the executive council, and the elected ministers by convention will de-
pend on the confidence of the legislature. The leader of the majority
in the elected house then may be styled Chief Minister. Certain depart-
ments still are retained by officials, including defense and external affairs,
and perhaps for a time the Attorney-General's department and internal
security. In matters concerning public order, public faith, and good
government, the Governor's reserved power to certify that a bill shall
have effect though it has not been passed by the legislature is available in
an emergency. The last transitional stage before independence usually is
internal self-government. The United Kingdom retains control only over
defense and external affairs and power to suspend the constitution in an
emergency, for which the Secretary of State remains responsible to the
United Kingdom Parliament. The executive council becomes the
Council of Ministers or Cabinet, over which the Governor ceases to pre-
side, and the Chief Minister is styled Prime Minister. The chief remain-
ing limitations are the subordination of the colonial legislature to the
United Kingdom Parliament, and the lack of international personality.
A colonial legislature cannot enlarge its own powers; still less can it law-
fully make a unilateral declaration of independence as Southern Rhodesia
purported to do in 1965.174 In Madzirnbamuto v. Lardver-Burke' the
Privy Council held that the nature of the sovereignty of the Queen in the
United Kingdom Parliament over a British colony must be determined
by the constitutional law of the United Kingdom. and that the Queen in
the United Kingdom Parliament still was sovereign in Southern Rhodesia
after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The Privy Council
held that the convention under which the United Kingdom Parliament
174. See K. ROBERTS-WRAY, supra note 135, at 991-93.
175. [1969] 1 A.C. 645 (P.C. 1968).
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did not legislate for Southern Rhodesia without the consent of its govern-
ment had no legal effect in limiting the powers of the United Kingdom
Parliament.176
Protectorates and Trust Territories
The largest areas of British jurisdiction in Africa were protectorates,
and most British protectorates were in Africa. These were under the
protection of the Crown, which was responsible for their external af-
fairs. Although they often were administered internally in a way similar
to that of adjoining colonies, as by Governor Lugard in Nigeria, they
were not British territory under constitutional law, and their inhabi-
tants were not British subjects.178 According to the British view, juris-
diction in "uncivilized" countries could be exercised only over the
nationals of the protecting power and of such other powers as gave their
consent, but Britain eventually adopted the view of other European
powers 79 that lawmaking power extended over all persons in a protec-
torate. Protected states, mostly in the Malay Peninsula and in the Pa-
cific,18° continued to be governed by their native rulers according to their
own customary systems of law, but uAder varying degrees of supervision
by British "residents" or "advisers." 181 Governmental acts by the Crown
in protectorates and protected states were regarded either as acts of state
or as authorized by foreign jurisdiction acts. 82 Similar principles applied
to mandated territories after World War I'8 and to trust territories after
World War II,184 except that the United Kingdom was responsible to
the League of Nations for the government of the former, and to the
United Nations for the government of the latter. The transition to self-
government was brought about in a way similar to that employed in the
colonies. All protectorates and trust territories now have been granted
176. Id. at 722-23.
177. Notably Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland.
178. Rex v. Crewe (Earl of), ex parte Segkome, [1910] 2 K.B. 576 (CA.); cf. Sobhuza
II v. Miller, [1926] A.C. 518 (P.C.).
179. General Acts of the Berlin Conference, (1885) C. 4739; Brussels Conference,
(1890) C. 6049.
180. Including Brunei and Tonga.
181. Duff Development Co. v. Kelantan, [1924) A.C. 797; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore,
[1894) 1 Q.B. 149.
182. Sobhuza II v. Miller, [1926] A.C. 518 (P.C.); Nyali Ld. v. Atty-Gen., [19561
1 Q.B. 1 (C.A. 1955).
183. Including Palestine.
184. Including Tanganyika.
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independence by acts of Parliament; if their inhabitants have not ac-
quired the citizenship of an independent country, they have the status of
British protected persons who are neither citizens of the United King-
dom and Colonies nor aliens.:1 5
Grants of Independence Since ".47
Since 1947 a large number of formerly dependent territories have been
granted independence by act of Parliament. Independence involves,
first, the freedom of the country concerned from dependence on the
Parliament and government of the United Kingdom, and, second, the ac-
quisition of international personality, the availability of application for
membership in the United Nations, and control over questions of state
succession. By the Government of India Act 1935,88 India had acquired
a considerable degree of internal self-government both centrally and in
the provinces, and early in World War II it was promised dominion
status when the war ended. By the end of the war, however, nothing
short of independence would satisfy the peoples of the subcontinent.
There were such bitter divisions between Hindus, Moslems, and other
communities that the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, with the
approval of Prime Minister Attlee, fixed a time limit for British with-
drawal, leaving the political leaders to compose their differences among
themselves according to their own methods. The series of postwar Inde-
pendence Acts began in 1947 with those for India 8 t and Ceylon,188
which remained in the Commonwealth, and for Burma8 9 which, in spite
of Attlee's plea that membership in the Commonwealth meant "indepen-
dence plus," chose to leave that association. The Ireland Act 1949
recognized the independence of the Republic of Ireland outside the
Commonwealth.'9 Comparable provisions were made by the South
Africa Act 1962,' 91 though South Africa's withdrawal upon becoming a
republic was the result of political pressure from other African members
of the Commonwealth. Meanwhile Ghana' 92 and Nigeria 93 followed
185. British Nationality (No. 2) Act 1964, c. 54, § 5, amending British Nationality
Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 32(1).
186. 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 2.
187. Indian Independence Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30.
188. Ceylon Independence Act 1947, 11 Geo. 6, c. 7.
189. Burma Independence Act 1947, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 3.
190. 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 41.
191. 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 23.
192. Ghana Independence Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 6.
193. Nigeria Independence Act 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 55.
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the example of Ceylon, and a number of other territories in all parts of
the world followed Ghana and Nigeria.
An independence act removes, in the general manner of sections 2,
3, and 4 of the Statute of Westminster 193 1,194 the three legislative limi-
tations of repugnancy to British statute law, extraterritoriality, and the
lawmaking power of the United Kingdom Parliament. The contingency
that the country concerned might request and consent to Parliament
legislating for it in the future, however, generally has been omitted.
Protectorates and trust territories are not within "Her Majesty's do-
minions" and therefore their independence acts technically have annexed
them to the Crown so that, on the withdrawal of protection, they might
be granted independence within the Commonwealth if that is desired, as
is usually the case. For trust territories, this process requires the ap-
proval of the United Nations. Provision is made that British protected
persons retain that status until they become citizens of an independent
country. Executive powers, whose exercise was thought to be covered
adequately by constitutional usages, were not dealt with by the Statute
of Westminster, which was intended o recognize dominion "autonomy"
rather than independence. The post-World War II Independence Acts,
however, expressly have provided that the United Kingdom government
should cease to be responsible for the government of the country con-
cerned.195 There usually is an agreement between the United Kingdom
and the territory concerned that the latter will succeed to the rights and
obligations affecting it that arise out of-international agreements. Some-
times the grant of independence also is accompanied by agreement with
the United Kingdom on external affairs, defense, and public officers,
though these agreements may be of short duration.19"
A newly independent member of the Commonwealth, when it revises
its constitution, tends to adopt the principle of "autochthony," the as-
sertion that its constitution is derived from its own people rather than
from a United Kingdom statute. Autochthony strictly requires a com-
plete breach in legal continuity, as it is the substitution of one basis of
the legal order for another, though in practice the process is often ac-
complished without anything like a revolution in the ordinary sense.
194. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4. See notes 149-50 supra & accompanying text.
195. E.g., Ceylon Independence Act 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 7, § 1(2); Ghana Inde-
pendence Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 6, § 1(6).
196. Such agreements were made upon the independence of Ceylon, Singapore, and
Malta.
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The notion of autochthony is hardly applicable to Canada, Australia,
or New Zealand. 19 7
Republics and the Westminster Model
The desire for independence is stimulated largely by British political
ideas, and nationalism marks the later stages in the development of depen-
dent territories even where, as in Africa, the territories never existed as
nations. At this stage there is, in effect, only one party, whose aim is to
end "colonialism"; but the British political system, the only system that
the British seek to bequeath to emancipated countries, presupposes two
main parties or groups, one being an effective opposition capable of pro-
viding an alternative ministry. Soon after independence, a one-party
system, to traditionalists a contradiction in terms, may be introduced,
especially if the country becomes a republic with a strong presidential
system. Thus, the "Westminster model" soon was abandoned in Pakistan
and Ghana, and since has been abandoned by most of the African mem-
bers of the Commonwealth. Before World War II, republicanism was
presumed to be inconsistent with membership in the Commonwealth be-
cause of common allegiance to the Crown; it was at least partly for this
reason that the Republic of Ireland left the Commonwealth. Nehru,
however, achieved what De Valera could not or would not. India's wish
to remain a full member of the Commonwealth after its imminent adop-
tion of a republican constitution'" was considered in 1949 by a meeting
of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. They agreed to the formula that
India would accept the King as the symbol of the free association of the
independent members of the Commonwealth of which it was a member,
and, thus, as the "Head of the Commonwealth." 199 This modification of
the Balfour Declaration of 1926200 marked the end of "common allegi-
ance." It was followed in 1955 on the eve of the first republican consti-
tution of Pakistan, 20 - and now republics in the African and Asian coun-
tries of the Commonwealth are numerous.
197. For a discussion of autochthony, see K. Wkmui, THE CONSTTUTO.NAL SThucTuEE
oF THE COMMONVEALTH 89-113 (1960).
198. See India (Consequential Provision) Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 92.
199. J. WHEELER-BENNSTT, KING GEoRGE VI, at 719-31 (1958). Sir Norman Brook,
Secretary to the Cabinet, went throughout the Commonwealth negotiating acceptance of
the title "Head of the Commonwealth."
200. See notes 143-44 supra & accompanying text.
201. The Pakistan (Consequential Provision) Act 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
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Associated States
A new kind of noncolonial status, falling short of independence, has
been devised for some of the smaller islands in the Caribbean following
the dissolution of the Federation of the West Indies in 1962 and the in-
dependence of the larger islands in that area. The West Indies Act 1967
provided that Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis-An-
guilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent would be states in association with the
United Kingdom2 2; the United Kingdom was to retain responsibility for
defense, external affairs, and citizenship,2 08 and the Governor was to rep-
resent the Queen. The associated states would have legislative powers
rather less extensive than those of the dominions under the Statute of
Westminster. 04 Apart from the compromise between colonial status and
independence, an interesting feature of this arrangement is that an asso-
ciated state may terminate unilaterally the association by the prescribed
legislative procedure, though the power of the United Kingdom to ter-
minate the association is subject to an assurance that it will not do so
without giving reasonable notice.
Fuell Membership in the Comnonwealth
The present-day Commonwealth is an anomalous institution. It scarce-
ly can be said to have a constitution, and it is not an international person.
Its basic rules are concerned mainly with the acquisition, continuance,
and discontinuance of membership, rather than with the incidents of
membership." 5 The rules are conventions that have grown out of prac-
tice and may be modified or discarded when it is thought convenient.
Although the grant of independence, whether within or outside the
Commonwealth, is a matter for the United Kingdom and the territory
concerned, admission to full membership in the Commonwealth is a
question that, by convention, requires consultation with all existing in-
dependent members because of their equality of status. There is no
unanimity rule; rather, it is a matter of consensus. Since 1947 it has
been recognized that an independent member may leave the Common-
wealth by voluntary secession. Such secession requires not only local
legislation, which in this respect would be beyond the powers of the
202. c. 4, § 1.
203. Id. § 2.
204. Compare id. § 4, sched. 1, 'ith Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4,
§ 3.
205. See S. D. SMITH, THE NEW Co ovwEALm A"i Ts CoNsrunmo 17-37 (1964).
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Parliaments of Canada and Australia, but also an act of the United King-
dom Parliament for such purposes, amending the British laws of citizen-
ship,20 6 visiting forces, extradition, and diplomatic immunities. Common-
wealth membership manifests itself mainly in the system of consultation.
Consultation, exchange of information, and cooperation take place mainly
in the fields of external affairs, defense, finance and economics, and edu-
cation. There also is a limited degree of mutual help, though consulta-
tion tends to emanate uniquely from the United Kingdom. The media
for consultation include the Crown and the Governor-General, meetings
of Prime Ministers, other ministers, and officials, the exchange of High
Commissioners or Ambassadors, and regular communication between the
British Foreign Office and the Departments of External Affairs in the
Commonwealth countries. A number of official organs also exist for
cooperation in such matters as agriculture and forestry, air transport,
economics, scientific liaison, shipping, statistics, and telecommunications.
Appeals to the Privy Council
The earlier history of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council to hear ap-
peals from overseas territories is bound up with that of the North Ameri-
can colonies.20" After the abolition of the wider judicial. powers of the
Privy Council in the 17th century, the remaining jurisdiction rested on
the prerogative of the King as the fountain of justice; its exercise, how-
ever, came to be regulated by the Judicial Committee Acts of 1833 and
1844, which created a Judicial Committee of qualified judges. 08 During
the last 200 years, the Privy Council, or its Judicial Committee, has heard
appeals from the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the colonies, and In-
dia; also, by virtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, 209 it has heard appeals
from protectorates, protected states, mandates, and trust territories. Ap-
peals "as of right" or by right of grant, in so far as they rest not on local
legislation but on an act of Parliament or a statutory order in council,
cannot be limited or abolished by the legislature of a dependent territory,
206. Citizens of independent members of the Commonwealth are "British subjects or
Commonwealth citizens" under the British Nationality Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, § 1.
The term "Commonwealth citizen" is used in practice, and is the only one appropriate
to citizens of republics.
207. See J.H. Somrr, APrws ro rim PArv' CouNcm FRom T A mEcAN PLANTA-
TIONS (1950).
208. Judicial Committee Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict, c. 69, amending Judicial Committee
Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41.
209. Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1913, 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 16, antending Foreign Jurisdiction
Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 37.
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because that would be contrary to the Colonial Laws Validity Act
18652 10 or to the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. Similarly, it has been held
that the power of the Privy Council to grant "special leave" to appeal
cannot be limited or abolished by the legislature of a dependent territory.
Any such limitation would be repugnant to the Judicial Committee Acts,
and could be effective only if construed as having extraterritorial opera-
tion; a colonial act, however, generally cannot have such operation.21'
The Imperial Conference of 1930 did not agree on any solution to the
question of appeals from the dominions to the Privy Council; it seems
clear that the Statute of Westminster did not intend to affect them.
British policy did not demand that the dominions would retain such
appeals against their will, though it was hoped that appeals would con-
tinue in the interest of the uniformity of the common law. The Judicial
Committee, in 1935, however, held that sections 2 and 3 of the Statute
of Westminster212 implicitly enabled a dominion to which the Statute
applied to abolish any or all appeals to the Privy Council, including ap-
peals by special leave .21 The same consequence followed from the vari-
ous independence acts since 1947. The tendency has been to abolish
appeals to the Privy Council upon assimption of republican status, if not
before. Appeals still lie from New Zealand, from the Australian states in
matters of state law, from a dwindling number of other independent
Commonwealth countries, and from the remaining colonies. A meeting
of Commonwealth Law Ministers in 1966 under the chairmanship of
Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, considered a proposal for a peripa-
tetic Commonwealth appeals court, but the proposal came too late to
interest many of the members.
CONCLUSION
The democratic trend in Great Britain clearly cannot be attributed
to any single factor. Key developments often have been dependent upon
personalities: at times upon the one on the throne, at times upon the one
occupying No. 10 Downing Street, and at times upon other officials and
210. 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63.
211. Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.) (Canadian statute intended to prevent
appeals in criminal cases invalid).
212. See notes 163-64 supra & accompanying text.
213. Accord, Atty-Gen. for Ontario v. Atty-Gen. for Canada, [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.)
(upholding amendment to the Supreme Court Act of Canada giving that court exclusive
appellate jurisdiction); British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.) (up-
holding Canadian statute preventing criminal appeal).
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members of Parliament. Historical factors, uncontrolled by Great Bri-
tain, such as movements for independence by colonists and the two
World Wars, also have hastened political change. Nonetheless, from the
independence of the Prime Minister from the Crown to the independence
of the colonies from the Commonwealth, the past 200 years have wit-
nessed a continued growth of democratic institutions and conventions in
Great Britain. Concurrently, there has been a gradual decentralization
of power, typified both by the development of new political relationships
with the states and territories that formerly had constituted the British
Empire, and by the consideration of devolution within the United King-
dom.
